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1 
ARTICLES 
MACHIAVELLIAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Brian L. Frye* 
ABSTRACT 
 
In his controversial essay, “Faith-Based Intellectual Property,” Mark Lemley 
argues that moral theories of intellectual property are wrong because they are based 
on faith, rather than evidence. This article suggests that Lemley’s argument is 
controversial at least in part because it explicitly acknowledges that consequentialist 
and deontological theories of intellectual property rely on incompatible normative 
premises: consequentialist theories hold that intellectual property is justified only if 
it increases social welfare; deontological theories hold that intellectual property is 
justified even if it decreases social welfare. According to Berlin, the genius of 
Machiavelli was to recognize that when two moral theories have incompatible 
normative premises, societies may be forced to choose between the theories. But 
Berlin observed that it is possible to adopt different moral theories in different 
contexts. This article suggests that we can reconcile consequentialist and 
deontological theories of intellectual property by adopting a consequentialist public 
theory and deontological private theories.  
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California, Berkeley, 1995. Thanks to Mark Lemley, Irina Manta, Janewa Osei-Tutu, Felix Chang, 
JoAnne Sweeny, Jamie Abrams, Justin Walker, James Grimmelmann and Katrina M. Dixon for helpful 
comments. 
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  P I T T S B U R G H  L A W  R E V I E W  
 
P A G E  |  2  |  V O L .  7 8  |  2 0 1 6  
 
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2016.423 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
INTRODUCTION 
“If a lion could speak, we would not understand him.”1 
Intellectual property scholars have advanced both consequentialist and 
deontological theories of intellectual property. Consequentialist theories are 
utilitarian, and hold that intellectual property is justified because it increases social 
welfare. The prevailing consequentialist theory is the economic theory, which holds 
that intellectual property is justified because it increases economic efficiency. By 
contrast, there are many different deontological theories of intellectual property, 
which typically hold that intellectual property is justified because creators have a 
moral right to own the fruits of their labor or the expressions of their personality.2 
I. “FAITH-BASED” INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
In his provocative essay, “Faith-Based Intellectual Property,” Mark Lemley 
argues that deontological or “moral” theories of intellectual property are wrong 
because they are based on faith, rather than evidence.3 Unsurprisingly, he begins by 
declaring his adherence to the consequentialist theory of intellectual property. 
According to Lemley, intellectual property is a form of regulation intended to 
encourage innovation and creation, and regulation requires a “cost-benefit 
justification.”4 In other words, intellectual property is justified if and only if it 
increases net social welfare. 
Next, Lemley reviews the evidence as to whether intellectual property is 
justified under the utilitarian theory.5 He concedes that some intellectual property 
rights may be justified and observes that historically, a lack of empirical evidence 
made it impossible to determine whether intellectual property rights were justified.6 
But he argues that empirical studies have now shown that some intellectual property 
                                                          
 
1 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 223 (1953). 
2 See generally William W. Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168 (2001); Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, 
in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 129 (2000). 
3 Mark Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328, 1328 (2015). 
4 Id. at 1331. 
5 Id. at 1331–33. 
6 Id. 
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rights are justified and others are not, and that increasing the scope of intellectual 
property rights is probably not justified in most cases: 
The relationship between patents and innovation seems to depend greatly on 
industry; some evidence suggests that the patent system is worth the cost in the 
biomedical industries but not elsewhere. Copyright industries seem to vary widely 
in how well they are responding to the challenge of the Internet, and their 
profitability doesn’t seem obviously related to the ease or frequency of piracy.7 
Then, Lemley observes that some intellectual property scholars have reacted to 
evidence that intellectual property does not increase social welfare by abandoning 
the utilitarian theory and adopting a moral theory, which he characterizes as a retreat 
from science to religion: “I call this retreat from evidence faith-based IP, both 
because adherents are taking the validity of the IP system on faith and because the 
rationale for doing so is a form of religious belief.”8 
Lemley argues that utilitarian theories of intellectual property are scientific 
because they are based on evidence and can be falsified, and moral theories of 
intellectual property are religious because they are based on belief and cannot be 
falsified.9 “Faith-based IP is at its base a religion and not a science because it does 
not admit the prospect of being proven wrong.”10 And as a consequence, the 
utilitarian and moral theories of intellectual property are fundamentally incompatible 
and irreconcilable: 
And that leads me to the last—and, to me, most worrisome—problem with faith-
based IP. If you are a true believer, we have nothing to say to each other. I don’t 
mean by that that I am giving up on you, deciding that you’re not worth my time 
to persuade. Rather, I mean that we simply cannot speak the same language. There 
is no principled way to compare one person’s claim to lost freedom to another’s 
claim to a right to ownership. Nor is there a way to weigh your claim of moral 
entitlement against evidence that the exercise of that right actually reduces 
creativity by others.11 
                                                          
 
7 Id. at 1334. 
8 Id. at 1337. 
9 Id. at 1346. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
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II. OBJECTIONS TO “FAITH-BASED INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY” 
Lemley’s article created quite a stir among intellectual property scholars, and 
it attracted substantial criticism. For example, Lawrence Solum observed that 
consequentialism may not provide a true moral theory, and Irina Manta suggested 
that the subjectivity of welfare may prevent the utilitarian theory of intellectual 
property from objectively determining whether intellectual property rights are 
justified.12 While both of these objections are well taken, neither is fatal to Lemley’s 
argument. 
Solum is correct that if consequentialism does not provide a true moral theory, 
Lemley’s argument must fail. But Solum’s objection is not specific to Lemley’s 
argument and would be true of any consequentialist moral theory. If 
consequentialism provides a true moral theory of anything, it also provides a true 
moral theory of intellectual property. Notably, consequentialism is the prevailing 
moral theory, and deontological moral theories typically try to reconcile themselves 
with consequentialism.13 
And Manta is correct that the subjectivity of welfare may preclude an objective 
determination of whether intellectual property rights are justified under the utilitarian 
theory. The utilitarian theory holds that intellectual property is justified if and only 
if it increases social welfare. Intellectual property both increases welfare by 
encouraging marginal innovators to invest in innovation and decreases welfare by 
discouraging marginal innovators and consumers from using innovations protected 
by intellectual property. But how can we objectively quantify and compare the 
subjective welfare created by innovation or precluded by intellectual property? And 
if we cannot objectively determine the net effect of intellectual property on social 
welfare, then the utilitarian theory cannot tell us whether intellectual property is 
justified. 
                                                          
 
12 Lawrence Solum, Lemley on Non-consequentialist Justifications for Intellectual Property, LEGAL 
THEORY BLOG (Apr. 2, 2015, 11:30 AM), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2015/04/lemley-on-
non-consequentialist-justifications-for-intellectual-propery.com; Irina D. Manta, Theory and Empirics: 
Where Do Locke and Mossoff Leave Us, LIBERTY OF LAW AND LIBERTY (May 8, 2015), http://www 
.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/theory-and-empirics-where-do-locke-and-mossoff-leave-us/. 
13 See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Salta ed., 2015), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/ 
ethics-deontological/ (discussing “threshold deontology”). 
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Of course, Manta’s objection is also not specific to Lemley’s argument, and it 
applies to any welfarist utilitarian moral theory. However, Lemley exposes—or 
rather creates—an Achilles heel in his argument by adopting a welfarist utilitarian 
theory of intellectual property in the first place. Lemley observes that a welfarist 
utilitarian theory of intellectual property “can and should value more than simply 
dollars.”14 And he is absolutely correct. But the obligation of welfarist utilitarian 
theories to consider non-economic welfare is both a strength and a weakness. 
While welfarist utilitarian theories of intellectual property have the advantage 
of addressing welfare created by subjective, non-economic incentives, like 
attribution, they have the corresponding disadvantage of indeterminacy. And that 
indeterminacy is a problem, because it prevents welfarist utilitarian theories from 
objectively determining whether intellectual property rights are justified. For 
example, Lemley argues that empirical studies show that some intellectual property 
rights are not justified because their costs exceed their benefits.15 But if a welfarist 
utilitarian theory cannot objectively quantify and compare the costs and benefits 
associated with intellectual property rights, it cannot tell us whether or not they are 
justified. 
The prevailing consequentialist theory of intellectual property is the economic 
theory, which holds that intellectual property is justified if and only if it increases 
economic efficiency.16 While the economic theory has the disadvantage of 
disregarding subjective, non-economic incentives, it has the advantage of increased 
determinacy. While measuring the economic efficiency of intellectual property rights 
is by no means easy, it is a considerably more manageable proposition than 
measuring subjective welfare. Moreover, at least some subjective, non-economic 
incentives are presumably captured by the revealed preferences of innovators and 
consumers.17 
                                                          
 
14 Lemley, supra note 3, at 1346. 
15 Id. at 1332–34. 
16 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause 
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual 
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and 
inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”), superseded by statute, 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1959), as 
recognized in Fabrica, Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 1983). 
17 See, e.g., Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65 (2015). But see, e.g., 
Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism, 59 
UCLA L. REV. 970 (2012) (criticizing both the welfarist utilitarian and economic theories of intellectual 
property). 
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But the prevailing response to Lemley’s article was discomfort.18 For example, 
Solum objected to Lemley’s observation that Locke and Rawls did not explicitly 
address intellectual property as a form of improper “argument from authority” and 
to his characterization of deontological theories of intellectual property as “faith-
based” as a form of “ad hominem argument.”19 Manta observed that utilitarian 
theorists rarely, if ever, favor increasing the scope of intellectual property, and she 
suggested that “the falsifiability that is [utilitarianism’s] point of pride” may be 
largely “theoretical.”20 Jeremy Sheff argued that deontological theorists do not 
actually reject consequentialism and suggested that deontological and 
consequentialist theorists “are simply disagreeing over the appropriate domain of 
empirical inquiry—chiefly with respect to the measurement of value.”21 And 
Stephanie Plamondon Bair argued that the consequentialist and deontological 
theories of intellectual property are actually consistent because perceived “fairness” 
may provide a salient ex ante incentive to marginal authors.22 
So, why did so many intellectual property scholars find Lemley’s argument so 
disturbing and controversial? Some of their objections go to the polemical tone of 
the essay. For example, Lemley argues that some intellectual property scholars have 
adopted moral theories of intellectual property precisely in order to ignore empirical 
evidence relating to the economic efficiency of intellectual property: 
Participants on both sides of the IP debates are increasingly staking out positions 
that simply do not depend on evidence at all. That is, their response to evidence 
that doesn’t accord with their beliefs is not to question their beliefs, or even to 
                                                          
 
18 See, e.g., Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Lemley on Faith-Based IP, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION (Apr. 2, 2015, 
9:59 PM), http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2015/04/lemley-on-faith-based-ip.html (observing that 
Lemley’s essay “has already ignited quite a discussion in the blogosphere” and collecting responses). 
19 Solum, supra note 12. 
20 Manta, supra note 12. But see, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (holding that extending 
the copyright term of existing works is consistent with the economic theory). 
21 Jeremy Sheff, Faith-Based vs. Value-Based IP: On the Lemley-Merges Debate (Apr. 2, 2015), http:// 
jeremysheff.com/2015/04/02/faith-based-vs-value-based-ip-on-the-lemley-merges-debate/. 
22 Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Rational Faith: The Utility of Fairness in Copyright, B.U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016). 
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question the evidence, but to retreat to a belief system that doesn’t require 
evidence at all.23 
In other words, proponents of intellectual property have adopted moral theories in 
order to ignore evidence that intellectual property may decrease social welfare, and 
detractors of intellectual property have adopted moral theories in order to ignore 
evidence that intellectual property may increase social welfare. That is a powerful 
charge of academic dishonesty, which may have provoked some of the objections to 
Lemley’s essay. 
James Grimmelmann specifically objected to the polemical tone of Lemley’s 
essay because he was concerned that it could make it more difficult for 
consequentialists and deontologists to reach consensus on the causal effects of 
intellectual property.24 He described Lemley’s essay as “an attempt to turn a 
scholarly debate into a culture war” by “tak[ing] questions about which reasonable 
minds can and do disagree and recast[ing] them such that reasonable minds cannot 
disagree because one of the alternatives is by definition unreasoned,” and argued, 
“[r]ecasting an empirical issue in cultural terms, as Lemley has done, makes it harder, 
not easier to reach empirical consensus.”25 
But I think that something else is also at stake. Many intellectual property 
scholars assume that consequentialist and deontological theories are compatible 
because they produce similar results.26 Indeed, many of the objections to Lemley’s 
essay explicitly assume that consequentialist and deontological theorists can find 
common ground.27 
I suspect that Lemley’s essay makes intellectual property scholars 
uncomfortable in large part because he observes that the consequentialist and 
deontological theories of intellectual property are fundamentally incompatible. And 
                                                          
 
23 Lemley, supra note 3, at 1336. 
24 James Grimmelmann, Faith-Based Intellectual Property: A Response, LABORATORIUM (2d Ser., 
Apr. 21, 2015), http://2d.laboratorium.net/post/117023858730/faith-based-intellectual-property-a-
response. 
25 Id. 
26 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76 IND. L.J. 
803 (2001). 
27 See, e.g., Sheff, supra note 21; Grimmelmann, supra note 24. 
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  P I T T S B U R G H  L A W  R E V I E W  
 
P A G E  |  8  |  V O L .  7 8  |  2 0 1 6  
 
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2016.423 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
I would like to suggest that Isaiah Berlin’s study of Machiavelli can help explain 
why that proposition is so controversial. 
III. MACHIAVELLI & CONFLICTING VALUES 
In his seminal essay, “The Question of Machiavelli,” Isaiah Berlin argued that 
Machiavelli’s great philosophical contribution was to show that normative theories 
may be incompatible, forcing people to choose one or the other.28 Berlin observed 
that scholars have advanced a congeries of theories of Machiavelli’s works, and he 
suggested that this surprising lack of consensus reflected “something peculiarly 
disturbing about what Machiavelli said or implied, something that has caused 
profound and lasting uneasiness.”29 According to Berlin, Machiavelli’s works were 
uniquely disturbing because they observed that Classical and Christian values are 
incompatible, and societies must choose between them.30 
The great originality, the tragic implications of Machiavelli’s theses seem to me 
to reside in their relation to a Christian civilization. It was all very well to live by 
the light of pagan ideals in pagan times; but to preach paganism more than a 
thousand years after the triumph of Christianity was to do so after the loss of 
innocence—and to be forcing men to make a conscious choice. The choice is 
painful because it is a choice between two entire worlds. Men have lived in both, 
and fought and died to preserve them against each other. Machiavelli has opted 
for one of them, and he is prepared to commit crimes for its sake.31 
Machiavelli is typically seen as a cynic who simply argued that morality 
inhibits political success. Berlin disagreed, arguing that Machiavelli was not a cynic 
at all, but rather a sincere believer in Classical values.32 “Machiavelli’s values may 
be erroneous, dangerous, [and] odious; but he is in earnest. He is not cynical. The 
                                                          
 
28 Isaiah Berlin, The Question of Machiavelli, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 4, 1971), available at http:// 
www.nybooks.com/articles/1971/11/04/a-special-supplement-the-question-of-machiavelli/. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
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end is always the same: a state conceived after the analogy of Periclean Athens, or 
Sparta, but above all the Roman Republic.”33 
Conventional wisdom assumes that a universal theory of normative ethics must 
govern human behavior. “If to ask what are the ends of life is to ask a real question, 
it must be capable of being correctly answered. To claim rationality in matters of 
conduct was to claim that correct and final solutions to such questions can in 
principle be found.”34 In other words, conventional wisdom assumes that Classical 
and Christian values are generally compatible, although they may conflict in certain 
extreme circumstances. In that case, Christian values can and should prevail, unless 
abnormal circumstances create an emergency that requires a wicked act. 
“[D]esperate cases require desperate remedies” and “necessity knows no law.”35 
Machiavelli disagreed. He believed that Classical and Christian values are 
fundamentally incompatible and that people must choose to live according to one or 
the other.36 This was a profoundly disturbing observation because it rejected the 
possibility of a universal moral theory: 
One is obliged to choose: and in choosing one form of life, give up the other. That 
is the central point. If Machiavelli is right, if it is in principle (or in fact: the frontier 
seems dim) impossible to be morally good and do one’s duty as this was conceived 
by common European, and especially Christian, ethics, and at the same time build 
Sparta or Periclean Athens or the Rome of the Republic or even of the Antonines, 
then a conclusion of the first importance follows: that the belief that the correct, 
objectively valid solution to the question of how men should live can in principle 
be discovered is itself, in principle, not true.37 
Ironically, Machiavelli himself was untroubled by the incompatibility of 
Classical and Christian values: 
The notion of raison d’état entails a conflict of values which may be agonizing to 
morally good and sensitive men. For Machiavelli there is no conflict. Public life 
                                                          
 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
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has its own morality, to which Christian principles (or any absolute personal 
values) tend to be a gratuitous obstacle. This life has its own standards: it does not 
require perpetual terror, but it approves, or at least permits, the use of force where 
it is needed to promote the ends of political society.38 
Machiavelli chose to adopt Classical values because he believed that only 
Classical values could promote the flourishing of the state.39 Accordingly, he 
willingly rejected Christian values, not because he saw them as wrong, but because 
he saw them as incompatible with Classical values and therefore detrimental to the 
flourishing of the state.40 
Essentially, Berlin argues that Machiavelli’s works were disturbing because 
they rejected the premise of a universal ethical theory and argued that different 
ethical theories must govern different circumstances.41 According to Machiavelli, 
Classical values and Christian values are not merely different, but incompatible.42 
Christian values may be appropriate to private life, but only Classical values are 
appropriate to public life. This observation was fatal to the universal humanist 
project. 
But Berlin recognized an alternative solution: rather than a single, universal, 
moral theory, we may reconcile ourselves to the fact that different moral theories 
may govern different circumstances.43 Rather than choose one theory, like 
Machiavelli, we may embrace the path of tolerance and the possibility of error: 
If there is only one solution to the puzzle, then the only problems are first how to 
find it, then how to realize it, and finally how to convert others to the solution by 
persuasion or by force. But if this is not so (Machiavelli contrasts two ways of 
life, but there could be, and, save for fanatical monists, there obviously are, more 
than two), then the path is open to empiricism, pluralism, toleration, compromise. 
Toleration is historically the product of the realization of the irreconcilability of 
equally dogmatic faiths, and the practical improbability of complete victory of one 
                                                          
 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
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over the other. Those who wished to survive realized that they had to tolerate error. 
They gradually came to see merits in diversity, and so became skeptical about 
definitive solutions in human affairs.44 
IV. MACHIAVELLIAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
The parallels between Machiavelli and Lemley should be obvious. Both are 
controversial because, inter alia, they explicitly recognize that two competing moral 
theories depend on fundamentally incompatible normative premises. Of course, 
neither Machiavelli nor Lemley found that observation troubling. Machiavelli 
observed that Classical values and Christian values are incompatible, and he chose 
Classical values. Lemley observed that the consequentialist and deontological 
theories of intellectual property are incompatible, and he chose consequentialism. 
But what makes their respective works controversial is not their choice of moral 
theory, but their frank acknowledgement that one must choose at all. 
Machiavelli was untroubled by the incompatibility of Classical and Christian 
values because he believed that only Classical values are consistent with the 
flourishing of the state.45 He rejected Christian values not because he believed they 
were wrong, but because he believed they were incompatible with the flourishing of 
the state.46 Berlin argued that Machiavelli was and remains controversial precisely 
because he explicitly recognized the incompatibility of Classical and Christian 
values.47 His contemporaries wished to believe that they could reconcile those 
values, but Machiavelli forced them to recognize that they could not.48 
Likewise, Lemley is untroubled by the incompatibility of the consequentialist 
and deontological theories of intellectual property because he believes that only 
consequentialism is compatible with public welfare.49 He rejects moral theories of 
intellectual property not because he believes they are wrong, but because he believes 
they are incompatible with increasing public welfare.50 
                                                          
 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1344–46. 
50 See id. at 1346 (“And that leads me to the last—and, to me, most worrisome—problem with faith-based 
IP. If you are a true believer, we have nothing to say to each other. I don’t mean by that that I am giving 
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  P I T T S B U R G H  L A W  R E V I E W  
 
P A G E  |  1 2  |  V O L .  7 8  |  2 0 1 6  
 
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2016.423 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
Many intellectual property scholars wish to believe that they can reconcile the 
consequentialist and deontological theories of intellectual property. For many 
scholars, both theories of intellectual property are compelling.51 They believe that 
the purpose of intellectual property is to increase public welfare by solving market 
failures in public goods, but they also believe that inventors and authors are entitled 
to certain exclusive rights in their inventions and works of authorship.52 Accordingly, 
they are comforted by the assumption that the consequentialist and deontological 
theories of intellectual property are broadly consistent, even if they occasionally 
conflict on the margins. Lemley’s article is troubling and controversial because he 
explicitly acknowledges that those competing theories are not consistent but are, in 
fact, fundamentally incompatible.53 In other words, he forces people to choose. And 
while he finds it an easy choice, others do not. 
V. BERLIN’S CHOICE 
So, how should we respond to such a Hobson’s choice? As Berlin observed, 
the incompatibility of Classical and Christian values can be resolved, or at least 
avoided, if one is willing to embrace tolerance and accept contradictions and 
contingency.54 Fortunately, the incompatibility of the utilitarian and moral theories 
of intellectual property can also be resolved or avoided in a similar way. 
Essentially, the consequentialist and deontological theories of intellectual 
property can be reconciled if one sees them as appropriate for different spheres of 
                                                          
 
up on you, deciding that you’re not worth my time to persuade. Rather, I mean that we simply cannot 
speak the same language.”). 
51 See, e.g., RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N. HYLTON, LAWS OF CREATION: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE 
WORLD OF IDEAS (2013). 
52 Id. 
53 While both Jeremy Sheff and Stephanie Bair argue that the consequentialist and deontological theories 
of intellectual property are compatible, neither makes a compelling case. Sheff argues that deontological 
theorists are also consequentialists because they care whether the consequences of the intellectual property 
are consistent with their deontological values. Sheff, supra note 21. While that is true, Sheff ultimately 
acknowledges that the tension between the consequentialist and deontological theories is the result of their 
incompatible normative premises. Id. By contrast, Bair argues that the consequentialist and deontological 
theories of copyright are compatible because perceived “fairness” may provide a salient ex ante incentive 
to some marginal authors. Bair, supra note 22. But even if that is true, it only shows that the 
consequentialist and deontological theories of intellectual property may contingently coincide under 
certain circumstances, not that they are compatible. 
54 Berlin, supra note 28. 
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activity. The consequentialist theories are appropriate for public actors, and the 
deontological theories are appropriate for private actors. 
The consequentialist theories of intellectual property are appropriate for public 
actors because they describe when it is justified for the state to intervene in the 
market of ideas by creating property rights in public goods. Specifically, they hold 
that the state may create intellectual property rights in expressions and ideas only if 
doing so will increase net public welfare. As Lemley observes, the deontological 
theories of intellectual property are necessarily incompatible with the 
consequentialist theories because they hold that the state must create and enforce 
certain intellectual property rights, even if they decrease net public welfare.55 
There is no contradiction between a consequentialist public theory and a 
deontological private theory of intellectual property. For example, Machiavelli 
argued that Christian values are no threat to Classical values, so long as they are 
confined to private action.56 Likewise, deontological theories of intellectual property 
are no threat to consequentialist theories of intellectual property, so long as they are 
confined to private action. In other words, there is no conflict between public actors 
adopting a consequentialist theory of intellectual property and individuals adopting 
deontological theories of intellectual property. The state should create and enforce 
intellectual property rights only when it legitimately believes that doing so will 
increase net public welfare, but individuals may choose to reward inventors and 
authors at their discretion, according to whatever moral values they wish to adopt. 
There is no tension between the two. 
As I have previously explained, intellectual property and charity law are 
complementary.57 The state is justified when it uses intellectual property to increase 
social welfare by solving market failures, but it is not justified when it uses 
intellectual property laws to bestow a windfall on those fortunate enough to have 
created inventions or works of authorship of special value. Intellectual property is 
justified when it provides an incentive to marginal inventors and authors, but not 
when it merely enables inventors and authors to collect additional rents. 
But there is no reason that individuals cannot act on their own to reward those 
who have contributed valuable inventions or works of authorship, and there is no 
reason that the government cannot encourage those acts of altruism. Indeed, as 
technology reduces the fixed, opportunity, and transaction costs associated with the 
creation and distribution of intellectual property, and as social technology reduces 
                                                          
 
55 See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1338–44. 
56 Berlin, supra note 28. 
57 Brian L. Frye, Copyright as Charity, 39 NOVA L. REV. 343, 343 (2015). 
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transaction costs associated with altruism, it becomes increasingly apparent that 
different ethical theories can govern intellectual property in different contexts. 
We have developed two different bodies of law specifically in order to address 
this issue: intellectual property and charity law. Intellectual property should reflect 
the strengths of the government. The government is good at solving market failures 
in public goods by providing an incentive for marginal inventors and authors to 
invest in the creation of inventions and works of authorship. But it is not good at 
determining how much people value those inventions and works of authorship once 
they are created, how much of the increase in net social welfare or “spillovers” to 
give to the creators of those inventions or works of authorship, or how to divide those 
spillovers among all creators of inventions and works of authorship.58 As a 
consequence, attempting to distribute those spillovers among inventors and authors 
through the intellectual property system creates a spoils system, which is inefficient 
because it distributes spillovers in a way that can have little or no incentive effect. 
By contrast, charity law is good at solving government failures or 
circumstances in which transaction costs associated with information and politics 
tend to cause the government to distribute resources inefficiently. By using charity 
law to encourage people to subsidize the production of charitable goods they value, 
including inventions and works of authorship, the government can achieve a more 
efficient and equitable distribution of spillovers to inventors and authors. The moral 
theories of intellectual property can facilitate this distribution by encouraging 
individuals to make such charitable contributions. 
Of course, charity failures, or inefficiencies in charity law, can reduce its ability 
to achieve those efficiencies. But as I have observed elsewhere, developments in 
social technology have substantially reduced those charity failures.59 Specifically, 
crowdfunding and related technologies have enabled individuals to directly support 
the inventors and authors who create inventions and works of authorship that they 
value.60 
Notably, this distinction between the relative role of intellectual property and 
charity law is consistent with Lemley’s characterization of deontological theories of 
intellectual property as “faith-based.” Consequentialist theories of government 
typically hold that government action intended to increase public welfare is justified, 
but the First Amendment prohibits direct government intervention in matters of faith. 
                                                          
 
58 See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 101 (2006). 
59 Brian L. Frye, Solving Charity Failures, 93 OR. L. REV. 155, 159 (2014). 
60 Id. 
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Of course, many people believe that religion also increases public welfare or is good 
in its own right, and charity law encourages them to take private action consistent 
with that belief by providing tax exempt status to religious organizations and 
enabling donors to deduct certain charitable contributions to religious organizations 
from their taxable income. 
Likewise, consequentialist theories of intellectual property hold that the 
government is justified in creating and enforcing intellectual property rights if and 
only if it believes that they will increase public welfare. But that is perfectly 
consistent with individuals taking private action to reward innovation, which is 
typically considered a form of charity. Perhaps we can facilitate a reconciliation of 
the consequentialist and deontological theories of intellectual property by 
recognizing that the state and individuals properly play different roles in promoting 
innovation. The state should properly focus on public welfare, and individuals should 
properly focus on moral desert. 
To analogize to Machiavelli, government must be ruthless, but individuals may 
be generous. Government must pursue the public interest, but individuals may 
reward private interests. In Machiavellian terms, Classical values are analogous to 
the consequentialist theories of intellectual property, and Christian values are 
analogous to the deontological theories of intellectual property. Set against each 
other, they inevitably conflict, but kept in their own separate spheres, they can 
harmoniously co-exist. 
